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Congressman Richard Bolling and Missouri Ethics Reform

Rebekkah Stuteville
Park University

Ethics reform for government institutions in the
United States has followed an uneven path since
modern reform efforts began in earnest in the 1970s
in the wake of Watergate. Ethics reform is arguably a
“reactive” and “piecemeal process” that has been
“undertaken defensively.”1 In the traditional cycle,
ethics reform rises on the public’s agenda after
scandals have been uncovered2; public officials then
become concerned about the reputation of their
institutions and their own electoral prospect.3 Then,
in response, regulations are crafted to prevent a
reoccurrence of behaviors.4 Once an ethical problem
is addressed through a regulatory “fix,” ethics reform
becomes less salient to the public.

This paper examines views on representation and
their effect on ethics reform through a decidedly
Missouri lens in the areas of conflicts of interest,
lobbying, and campaign finance. First, the paper
looks at ethics reform in the context of the role of the
state legislator’s or congressional member’s duties as
a representative of his or her constituents and in
relationship to common standards of ethics. Second,
the paper explores Congressman Richard Bolling’s
perspective on ethics reform. Bolling represented the
state of Missouri in the U.S. House of Representatives
for over three decades and he was a well-known
advocate of congressional reform, including ethics
reform. Finally, the paper examines the ethics reform
that appears to be emerging in the state of Missouri.

Ethics Reform, Representation, and Standards

Ethics reform, however, is not solely about designing
rules to curb isolated incidents of undesirable
behavior by public officials. Ethics reform in
legislatures at both the federal and state levels reveals
important beliefs about how the American system of
government operates.5 Legislative ethics involves
conflicting views about the nature of representation6
as well as different perspectives on the
responsibilities of office-holders to citizens and the
government institutions in which they serve.7

Efforts to change campaign finance laws, control the
revolving door between the public and private sectors,
and reduce conflicts of interest are not exclusively
about controlling discrete instances of self-interested
behavior by legislators at the federal and state levels.
Legislative ethics is connected to beliefs about how
elected officials serve as representatives and their
responsibilities as representatives.8 For example,
when looking at some of the complexities of
representation and ethics in the area of conflicts of
interest, Charlene Wear Simmons argues that the
“unclear, contradictory meanings of representation
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create practical obstacles to resolving legislative
conflict of interest problems.”9 Simmons explains
that legislative conflicts of interest can be viewed
from the perspective of two traditional models of
representation—the delegate and trustee.10 Both
models entail legitimate functions of representation,
but they place different emphasis on the way in which
the public interest is realized in the policy process,
which has implications for ethics. The delegate model
is grounded in shared interests, while the trustee
model relies on independent judgement.
In the delegate model the elected official ably serves
her constituents because she shares their
“backgrounds and interests.”11 For example, in the
delegate model it is desirable for a legislator from a
ranching community to represent livestock interests,
and her ability to do so is enhanced by her occupation
as a rancher. As Dennis F. Thompson explains, when
serving as a delegate “a legislator cannot adequately
represent the interests of constituents without also
representing some of his or her own.”12 In this model
particular interests are translated into the more
general public good by delegates assuming the role of
“broker.”13 Thus representation involves sharing and
advocating for the interests of constituents since a
“clash of interest against interest” will arguably
promote the public interest or at least keep one group
from dominating the policy process.14
The delegate and broker roles, however, are often
viewed with skepticism. The criticisms are rooted in
suspicion of human nature as well as the feasibility of
all interests being represented in policymaking. The
fear about human nature is that a delegate’s “personal
interest will supersede the public interest when the
two become intertwined.”15 For example, whose
interest is the rancher legislator representing when
legislation is proposed that may affect the pool of
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labor available to ranchers? Her own interests, her
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advocate for the state or country or workers. A related
criticism is that the mechanism for achieving the
public interest does not function in the manner
suggested since not all interests are represented and
heard in a system of “delegates” and “brokers.” The
more powerful and wealthy interests prevail in a
system based on influence. As E.E. Schattschneider
famously remarked “the flaw in the pluralist heaven
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The traditional alternative to the delegate is the trustee
model. The trustee is a representative who
demonstrates independent judgement and is
unbiased.17 The elected official relies on her
judgement rather than that of her constituents’ to do
what she believes is in the best interest of her
constituents, the state, or the nation as a whole. The
trustee embraces state or national interests rather than
interests of specific groups, and ideally she acts as
statesperson.
The trustee model, however, cannot be disassociated
from concerns about human nature either. Critics of
the trustee model cite the middle-class professional
bias of trustees who may substitute their middle-class
judgement for that of those they represent, and leave
the interests of a large segment of the population
without a voice.18 Thus the trustee model does not
control for human nature nor does it resolve the
problem of unequal influence by groups with more
resources.19 For practical purposes, members of
Congress and state legislatures may not be strict
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adherents to only one model. They may be a trustee
on one issue, but a delegate on another.
Additionally, Thompson argues that the trusteedelegate dichotomy is not especially useful for
developing ethical standards or principles.20 There is,
however, value in the dichotomy insomuch as it
moves the discussion of ethics reform beyond a
narrow concern regarding conflicts of interest to the
moral obligations of elected representatives to
promote justice and seek a “just representation of
interests.”21 Representation is not only about the
“one-to-one relation between constituents and
legislators, but a collective process involving
systematic interactions among many people holding
different roles,”22 which may include legislators,
special interests, and citizens.
In addition to using traditional constructs of
representation such as the delegate and trustee, other
standards can be employed to analyze legislative
ethics. Alan Rosenthal explores traditional standards
for examining political ethics and proposes some of
his own standards in his book Drawing the Line:
Legislative Ethics in the States. First, Rosenthal
explains that the notions of autonomy and publicity
are often standards employed by ethicists.23
Autonomy calls for legislators to act independently
and make judgements that are “‘informed, unbiased,
and uncoerced.’”24 Similarly, publicity is a commonly
embraced standard since legislators are supposed to
be accountable to the citizens who elect them and
whom they serve.25

maintenance and functioning of legislative
institutions) are the standards that should be used.28
All of the standards discussed by Rosenthal are
evident in the writings of Congressman Richard
Bolling. These standards as well as the trustee and
delegate models will be used to examine Bolling’s
approach to legislative ethics.

Missouri Congressman Richard Bolling
Congressman Richard Bolling served Missouri in the
U.S. House of Representatives for decades, and was
an ardent reformer. His philosophy about ethics
reform and representation often aligns more closely
with the trustee model, but elements of the delegate
model are evident as well. His tendency toward the
trustee model is noticeable in his 1965 book House
Out of Order in which he quotes Edmund Burke’s
1774 speech in which Burke claims that a
“representative owes you not his industry only, but
his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you,
if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”29
On one hand Bolling’s trustee leanings may reflect
the national stage he operated on, but, on the other
hand, it may indicate a pattern of preference for
independent judgement. The ethical standards
outlined by Rosenthal30 also run throughout Bolling’s
writings, but emphasis is placed on the standard of
autonomy which is compatible with the trustee role.

Rosenthal, however, argues that both autonomy and
publicity suffer from being difficult to
operationalize.26 Autonomy rests on defining
“improper” influence, which is a slippery slope in
politics, and publicity may inhibit the type of
compromise required by democracy.27 Rosenthal,
instead, argues that appearance, fairness (primarily to
the legislators), and responsibility (for the

Bolling’s ideas about reform had theoretical
underpinnings, but he crafted a pragmatic approach to
representation and ethics which was guided by his
experience as “lieutenant and legman” to powerful
House of Representatives Speaker Sam Rayburn.31
His notions about reform were further sharpened with
time in Congress, particularly with his experience
serving as chairman of the influential House Rules
Committee. Bolling’s ideas represent an interesting
combination of both political theory and practical
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politics.

Conflict of Interests

Bolling began his career in the U.S. House
representing Missouri’s 5th District in 1949. After 16
years in Congress, Bolling wrote House Out of Order
in which he proclaimed:

Bolling’s position on conflicts of interest reveals an
underlying concern about the ability of members of
Congress to regulate their own behavior when selfinterest is involved. It also illustrates his preference
for creating independent bodies to monitor behavior,
and an emphasis on transparency as a tool. The
standards of fairness, publicity, and “unbiased”
judgement34 are all evident in Bolling’s approach to
conflicts of interest.35

“. . . the House has revealed itself to me as
ineffective in its role as a coordinate branch of
the federal government, negative in its approach
to national tasks, generally unresponsive to any
but parochial economic interests. Its procedures,
time-consuming and unwieldy, mask anonymous
centers of irresponsible power. Its legislation is
often a travesty of what the national welfare
requires.”32
In House Out of Order Bolling set about outlining a
three-pronged approach for remedying the problems
of the House through: 1) Redrawing the boundaries of
Congressional districts, 2) Implementing reforms that
affect individual members by eliminating conflicts of
interest, disclosing financial holdings, limiting
influence on executive and regulatory bodies, and
campaign finance, and 3) Reforming the procedures
in Congress.33
House Out of Order explains the foundation of
Bolling’s position on conflicts of interest, lobbying,
and campaign finance reform, all of which articulate
some concern about the role of representatives who
may not see beyond self-interest or be able to untangle
themselves from powerful moneyed interests
financing their campaigns. The book also previews
Bolling’s plans for committee reform which is a
window into his views on representation as well as
early concerns about deteriorating party discipline in
the House of Representatives.
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For Bolling the two central questions related to
conflicts of interest are: 1) “What kinds of outside
employment and income are compatible with what
kinds of committee assignments?” and, 2) “How far
should a Member go in voting on matters in which he
has some personal stake?”36 On the subject of outside
employment, Bolling’s solution was a practical one
that emphasized fairness to his colleagues.37 Bolling
proposed mitigating the influence of outside
employment on congressmen by reducing their need
for outside income. He acknowledged the inadequacy
of the $22,500 salary for members in 1964 for
meeting the demands of family and their jobs.38 He
suggested increasing salaries, travel allowances, and
pensions to ensure that their service in Congress is a
full-time job.39 Bolling also recommended that
members of Congress should be required to file a
publicly available report of their income, gifts, assets,
contributions, real estate, securities, and relatives
employed by the federal government.40
In answer to the question on conflicts of interest in
voting, Bolling believed in adherence to the
“Jefferson Rule” which was in effect in the House
until the 1870s.41 The “Jefferson Rule . . . requires that
if ‘the private interests of a member are concerned in
a bill or question, he is to withdraw’—that is, step
aside and not vote.”42 He preferred the “Jefferson
39
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Rule” over the more lenient practice instituted in the
House of Representatives in 1874 which allowed a
member of the House to “vote his private interests if
the measure is not for his exclusive benefit.”43 Bolling
questioned, “Where is the Member to draw the line?
Or should it be drawn for him? And, if so, by
whom?”44 Bolling advocated for a reasonable, but
relatively bright line for members of Congress which
does not allow members to “be a judge in [their] own
cause.”45 To help remedy conflicts of interest Bolling
supported a commission on legislative ethics with at
least half of the members from outside Congress
which would study conflicts of interest and issue
public reports.46 Again, Bolling saw wisdom in
monitoring by external parties and scrutiny by the
public.

Lobbyists
Bolling’s writings on lobbying demonstrate an
appreciation for the role of interest groups, but
through a practical lens. Bolling considered lobbying
“an indispensable adjunct of the legislative
process.”47 He respected the functions that lobbyists
play by providing information to members of
Congress and the rights of lobbyists under the First
Amendment.48 However, he also recognized the
influence that lobbies have in providing campaign
support to candidates who favored their agendas, and
in getting “friendly” candidates on key committees.49
Bolling believed that “It is the gray area in the
lobbying picture that must be clarified.”50
Bolling pressed for transparency and regulation of
lobbying activities,51 and, once again favored the
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standard of publicity.52 In testimony before the
Standards of Official Conduct, Bolling stated that “As
one who has long advocated opening up the business
of the Congress to the public, it is my firm belief that
efforts to influence legislation are an important part
of that business of which the public has the right to
know.”53 In the early 1970s, Bolling called for
lobbyists to file reports with the attorney general and
provide more detailed reports of expenditures and
contributions. He also wanted the attorney general to
review the reports and recommend action for
inaccurate reports and failures to file, with the
information being publicly available.54
Later in 1977 Bolling served as floor manager when
the House of Representatives adopted a code of ethics
which regulated, among other things, gifts from
lobbyists.55 The measure prohibited gifts over $100
from lobbyists and required disclosure of virtually all
gifts, regardless of the source.56 As argued by
Rosenthal, such limits are in line with the ethical
standards of appearance and responsibility.57
Bolling’s opinion on lobbyists reflected another
aspect of his thinking on representation—his desire
for a system in which all voices in the policy process
are politically informed, active, and represented.58
Bolling conceded that the “lobbies are as diverse as
our society”59 but also lamented that the leaders of the
lobbies may be out of touch with their membership
and become interested in “self-perpetuation”60 rather
than representation. Additionally, he expressed
concern for the “regular constituents” who were more
“acted upon than acting,” but who could play an
important role in the democratic process by becoming
53

Bolling Testimony Before Standards of Official Conduct
(Reading Copy), March 16, 1971, 3, LaBudde Special
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 83, folder 13.
54
Bolling Press Release, October 8, 1970, LaBudde Special
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 83, folder 13.
55
Independence Examiner Article, “Here’s What New House
Code of Ethics Provides,” March 4, 1977. LaBudde Special
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 205, folder 7.
56
Ibid.
57
Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 137.
58
Bolling, House Out of Order, 142-143.
59
Ibid, 133.
60
Ibid, 143.

6 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 5 (Summer/Fall 2017)

more informed and involved.61 Bolling saw the
informed individual voter as part of the solution to the
powerful lobbyists, but citizens would have to be
more informed, willing to make small contributions
to their national parties, and more engaged in
politics.62

Campaign Finance Reform
Bolling’s position on the influence of money in the
legislative process was consistent with his position on
the influence of money in the electoral process.
Freeing legislators from the perceived obligations of
lobbyists and large donations could potentially make
legislators more autonomous and enable them to
make “‘unbiased, and uncoerced judgments.’”63 In
1973, Bolling proclaimed that “I know of nothing
more important than getting control of the whole
problem of money in politics.”64
The legislation that Bolling supported on campaign
finance aligned directly with his preference for
independent commissions and fuller representation
by giving all a voice through smaller contributions.
He became a supporter of the Clean Elections Act of
1973 which proposed an independent bipartisan
federal elections commission with the ability to
investigate violations of law, annual contribution
limits for individuals and organizations, matching
federal grants for small contributions, and blocks of
time on television for candidates.65
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Congressional Committee Reform
Finally, Bolling is perhaps best known for his failed
attempt to reform the House of Representatives
committee system. Although indirectly related to
ethics, Bolling’s writings on committee reform reveal
his philosophy about the restrained use of power and
his emphasis on national concerns rather than
parochial interests.
Bolling’s proposal to change the House committee
structure, H.R. 988, included provisions for
rearranging the jurisdiction of specific House
committees such as the powerful Ways and Means
Committee. The measure also sought to concentrate
jurisdiction for a subject in one committee and limit
each member of the House to one major committee.
Finally, the measure established a system of
congressional oversight over executive branch
agencies to monitor the implementation of Congress’s
programs.66
Bolling was keenly aware of power and the use of
power. He undertook the redesigning of the House
Committee system because of the influence
committees wield. Bolling acknowledged that “I am a
very power-conscious person who feels that he should
be humble in the exercise of that power.”67 Bolling
referred to standing committees as “‘strategic points
of influence.’”68 He recognized that committees
control the substance of bills and the bills that get
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since conservative Democrats, the minority in the Democratic
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conservative foxes in charge of the liberal chicken coops” to
the Republicans’ delight (Bolling, House Out of Order, 237).
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reported out.69 Bolling also argued that the committee
structure influences the interests that are represented
in the legislative process. Committee structure
determines which citizens have input, a committee’s
focus on narrow special interests or broader concerns,
and whether Congress can address national problems
comprehensively or in a fragmented manner.70 In
other words, committee structure influences the
nature of representation. It dictates both the inputs and
the outcomes of the policy process. Bolling also
viewed the power of the committee system as
competing with the Speaker of the House’s power,
and denying the speaker of the House the tools he
needed for control.71 Instead of power resting with the
speaker, it rested in a few committee chairs who were
“anonymous” and unaccountable.72
As illustrated, Bolling’s proposal for congressional
committee reform highlights seemingly contradictory
themes. He believes that power must be checked to
create avenues for more voices to be heard, but
legislators must have opportunity to exercise
judgment in pursuit of the national interest and may
not always listen to other voices. Similarly, legislators
should exercise judgement, but should do so under the
firm direction of the party leaders. Bolling attempts to
mold and reconcile tensions in the political process
with the twin purposes of being a politician pursuing
political objectives and a statesman seeking to
responsibly preserve the institution.73
Bolling’s Brand of Legislative Ethics Reform
Bolling’s approach to ethics reform is a complex
blend of the trustee and delegate models of
69
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representation. His view of representation aligns with
the trustee model in that he wants members of the
House to use their own judgement74 and embrace a
national view over parochial interests. Bolling,
however, seems skeptical that this will happen
voluntarily and his writings reflect a Madisonian
realism that those in government are not angels, thus
external and internal controls are required.75
However, Bolling’s trustee leanings do not provide
the groundwork for all of his thinking on ethics
reform. At least one of Bolling’s remedies to the
problems of ethics more closely aligns with the
delegate model. The notion that actions such as
accepting gifts from lobbyists should be subjected to
public scrutiny because elected officials are
accountable to their constituents is closer to the
delegate approach.76
Bolling’s legislative ethics also incorporate many of
the standards discussed by Rosenthal.77 Bolling’s
writings feature autonomy as a goal with publicity as
his preferred tool. There is also an undercurrent of
concern for the House as an institution, and an
understanding by Bolling that he is a “custodian[s] of
representative democracy.”78
Bolling seeks to restrain the self-interested behavior
of individual congressmen during a time of eroding
party discipline, while still allowing them to exercise
judgment in policy concerns. He seeks to check the
power of moneyed interests in the electoral and
legislative processes to give all voices a chance of
being heard, while still acknowledging that the policy
“whole” has to be greater than the sum of the
individual “parts” in the political process for national
goals to be realized for the welfare of the country.79
become more institutionalized. (Jennings, “The
Institutionalization of Ethics in the U.S. Senate,” 9).
73
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Bolling searched for a means to promote a “just
representation of interests”80 which combines respect
for particular interests inherent in the delegate model
with a desire for the broader view of the statesman’s
independent judgment inherent in the trustee model.

State of Missouri Legislature
There are practical and theoretical challenges when
comparing an individual congressman at the national
level during one time period with an institution at the
state level in another. For example, serving in the U.S.
Congress is a full-time job, whereas state legislators
may still be citizen-legislators in many places. In the
area of ethics reform, however, there are common
themes that cross units of analysis and boundaries of
time. Conflict of interest, lobbying, and campaign
finance continue to dominate questions of legislative
and executive ethics due to the influence of money
and the importance of power in the American system
of government.
Moreover, the standards of autonomy, publicity,
appearance, fairness, and responsibility81 still apply to
legislative ethics. Finally, Bolling was in Congress
before, during, and after Watergate—a time when
ethics reform resonated with the media and public.
There was momentum for reform at the national level.
Similarly, the current climate in Missouri is one in
which ethics reform is salient to the public.
The state of Missouri has, at times, had the distinction
of being a state with some of the most lenient ethics
requirements for legislators in the nation.82 As
representation of interests. In a properly functioning
representative system, policies and decisions are not simply an
aggregation of all the interests expressed in the political
process” (Thompson, The Ethics of Representation, 12).
80
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explained by Dan Schnurbusch, at different points in
history Missouri citizens and legislators have been
committed to rooting out corruption and favoritism
for special interests, but at other times the power
structure has supported the status quo and even
“roll[ed] back former efforts at reform.”83 Lax ethics
requirements have earned Missouri the moniker of
“The Wild Mid-West.”84 As Jason Hancock explains:
“For years, Jefferson City’s reputation has been
fueled in part by the fact that Missouri is the only state
with no limits on both campaign contributions and
lobbyist gifts. And as a result of that dynamic, sixand seven-figure donations to Missouri campaigns
have become commonplace, and elected officials
combine to accept hundreds of thousands of dollars in
free meals, booze, trips and events tickets every
year.”85
The recent history of campaign finance illustrates the
political struggle over ethics reform that has taken
place in the state among citizens, the legislature,
governor, and the courts. Missouri voters have long
been in favor of caps on campaign contributions. Over
twenty years ago, in 1994, Missourians
“overwhelmingly” voted for limits on contributions.86
The Missouri legislature later passed a law in 2006 to
repeal the limits and the legislation was signed into
law by the governor.87 The 2006 law was
subsequently “struck down” by the Missouri Supreme
Court due to procedural issues.88 Shortly after the
court’s decision, the Missouri Legislature responded
by again passing legislation repealing campaign
contribution limits, which was signed into law by the
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governor in 2008.89 After eight years without
campaign contribution limits in place, Missouri
voters one more time cast their vote in favor of
campaign contribution limits by passing Amendment
2 in November 2016.90 As of December 2016,
however, the challenges in the courts had begun with
claims that the new limits place an unconstitutional
burden on free speech and association.91
There was skepticism regarding the effect of
Amendment 2 well before the recent 2016 court
challenges. Amendment 2 was passed against the
national backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 2010
Citizens United decision to eliminate the restrictions
on independent expenditures by unions and
corporations for advertisements to defeat candidates
and the 2014 McCutcheon decision to eliminate the
aggregate limits on the number of candidates and
parties to which one individual can give.92 As
reported by Jessica Karins, the reason that the passage
of Amendment 2 in Missouri is “unlikely to transform
politics is that political money in Missouri may
simply take other routes . . . Thanks to the U.S.
Supreme Court's Citizens United decision, those
PACs can’t be stopped or silenced so long as they
don’t coordinate directly with candidates. So by
taking big money out of individual candidate coffers,
Amendment 2 may simply be opening the floodgates
to massive expenditures from special interest groups
or donors.”93
Although Amendment 2 may not have a
transformative effect on Missouri politics, the
89

Ibid.
Missouri Secretary of State, State of Missouri-2016 General
Election-November 8, 2016, Official Results, accessed January
15, 2017, http://enr.sos.mo.gov/.
91
Jeff D. Gorman, “Businesses Challenge Missouri Donation
Limits,” Courthouse News Service, December 28, 2016,
accessed January 15, 2017,
https://courthousenews.com/businesses-challenge-missouricampaign-donation-limits/.
92
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, accessed
January 15, 2017,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf;
John Dunbar, “The ‘Citizens United’ Decision and Why It
Matters,” The Center for Public Integrity, October 18, 2012,
accessed January 15, 2017,
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/10/18/11527/citizensunited-decision-and-why-it-matters; McCutcheon et al. v.
Federal Election Commission, accessed January 15, 2017,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/1290

passage of Amendment 2 by the citizens of Missouri
signals a desire for reform on the part of the public.
Additionally, some of the proposals “floated” for
2017 in the state of Missouri included bans on
lobbyist gifts, extending the six-month waiting period
for lawmakers to become lobbyists, and enhancing
the power of the Missouri Ethics Commission.94
As with many issues in politics, leaders in Missouri
government are in the process of balancing a variety
of standards and values. Legislators must be able to
make a living while serving in the state Legislature
(fairness) and be able to finance their campaigns.
However, they should also be free from undue
influence of lobbyists (autonomy), consider the
effects of appearance on the confidence of the public
(appearance), and be mindful that they are stewards
of democracy (responsibility).95 Ethics reform is
further complicated by questions such as the role of
interest groups in the American system of
government, the interplay between particular interests
and the public interest, and representation.
Bolling’s thinking on ethics reform may inform the
state of Missouri if legislators revisit the state’s
approach to legislative ethics. Bolling’s writings span
the continuum of ethics issues from practical
considerations of political power and control to more
theoretical considerations about the nature of
representation itself and ethical standards. Thus
Bolling’s thinking may help contemporary ethics
reformers who desire legislative and electoral
processes that are “open, accountable, and
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unbought.”96 His brand of political pragmatism and
ethical standards from the 20th Century may be
instructive for 21st Century legislative reformers.
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